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Abstract. Temporality enters our immediate experience as passage and becoming: the role time 
plays in the construction of a world of enduring entities tends to go unnoticed. This paper examines 
the relation between time and ontology in the context of unilateral neglect, a neuropsychological 
syndrome in which patients fail to perceive or respond to stimuli in the contralateral hemifield, 
behaving as if that half of space does not exist. Traditional models characterize neglect exclusively 
in spatial terms. Based on recent investigations suggesting abnormal temporal dynamics,  here we 
highlight the impact of time factors on the presentation of the disorder. Neglect patients do not 
simply miss the presence of stimuli on the left: they also ignore the past as well as the future of 
neglected stimuli. We claim that, if this occurs, it is because time, and not only space, is impaired.  
 
Keywords: unilateral neglect, time, temporal abnormalit ies, loss of awareness. 
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Depending on the severity of the pathology, neglect may be noticed merely by observing patients’ 
spontaneous behaviour: patients with neglect may not notice objects on the left of a scene, may not 
eat food on the left side of the plate, may ignore the left part of words. When asked to write, they 
may only use the right side of the page. Similarly, if asked to copy or draw an object they may 
neglect to report elements on the left, drawing in fact only half of it. 
These bewildering behavioural manifestations clearly exhibit a spatial gradient: the patient 
behaves as if half of the space does not exist, failing to report, react or search for stimuli located in 
the space contralateral to the lesion. The spatial nature of neglect is manifest and, understandably, 
interest in research has focused on spatial mechanisms (Halligan, Fink, Marshall, & Vallar, 2003). 
Here, we intend to focus on a dimension that, although less evident, is nevertheless no less 
important in the presentation of the disorder: time. 
Compared with spatial cognition, little is known about the neuropsychology of time. In this 
paper we first summarize the results of recent investigations suggesting abnormal temporal 
dynamics in neglect. Next, we consider some of the empirical and theoretical issues raised by this 
evidence: do the temporal abnormalities observed in neglect reflect the impairment of a unique 
mechanism or do they arise in relation to different timing systems? Do temporal deficits in neglect 
relate to spatial distortions? A final concern relates to the contribution of temporal deficits to 
neglect per se, i.e. to the loss of awareness for contralateral stimuli and events characteristically 
observed in neglect patients. It is impossible for us – wrote Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason 
(1787) – to represent things outside space and time and this is because things appear to us as spatio-
temporally connoted. Whereas previous work focused on the role of spatial encoding, here we 
highlight time factors. Neglect patients do not simply miss the presence of stimuli on the left: they 
also ignore the past as well as the future of neglected stimuli. We claim that, if this occurs, it is 
because time, and not only space, is impaired.  
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Temporal abnormalities at different temporal scales 
Temporal abnormalities in neglect are revealed in temporal integration (Duhamel, Goldberg, 
Fitzgibbon, Sirigu, & Grafman, 1992; Heide, Blankenburg, Zimmermann, & Kömpf, 1995), as well 
as in temporal processing (Husain, Shapiro, Martin, & Kennard, 1997; Hillstrom, Husain, Shapiro, 
& Rorden, 2004) and in retaining information over time (Husain, Mannan, Hodgson, Wojciulik, 
Driver, & Kennard, 2001; Pisella, Berberovic, & Mattingley, 2004). One source of ambiguity is that 
these abnormalities are measured over a wide range of timescales, from milliseconds to seconds and 
minutes. Here we consider three different intervals or timescales: temporal abnormalities at the 
scale of tens to hundred milliseconds, abnormalities in the range of 400 ms, and finally, 
abnormalities in the range of seconds. 
 
1001 ms: maintaining stable representations of visual stimuli across saccades 
Despite our impression of a full and coherent world as immediate and instantaneous, ‘seeing’ is 
itself a temporal fact, requiring an integration over time (Humphreys, 1997). Since visual 
information is sampled at high resolution over only a few degrees of visual angle at the fovea, a 
complete representation of a scene requires the contents of individual eye fixations to be integrated 
over space and time (Resink, 2000). During monitoring of a visual scene, we move our eyes 
constantly, performing large saccades during inspection of the global scene, and smaller saccades 
when sampling information at a smaller spatial scale. In the primary visual cortex, the retinal image 
is constructed anew at each eye fixation, overwriting all previously encoded information. Without 
re-mapping to maintain and re-locate neural activity corresponding to these inputs, this general 
overwriting phenomenon would extend further, leading to the disappearance of relevant information 
across ocular shifts: the world would appear as a sequence of non–integrated visual snapshots, at 
different spatial scale (Pisella & Mattingley, 2004). 
                                                 
1 100 ms is the duration of a saccade covering a 40° angular displacement.  
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Re-mapping deficits in neglect are suggested by studies requiring the use of a double-step 
paradigm (Duhamel et al., 1992; Heide et al. 1995). 
   
 
 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
 
 
 
In this paradigm, two sequentially flashed targets (A and B) must be fixated by two consecutive 
saccades departing from a central fixation point toward A, and then from A to B. When the two 
targets are extinguished within 180 ms – too short a period of time to direct eye movements to both 
targets prior to them being removed from the display - the generation of a spatially accurate second 
saccade requires a re-mapping. This process allows the oculo-motor system to anticipate the new 
position of B by integrating the displacement on the retina produced by the first saccade toward 
position A with oculo-motor information.  
This process of re-mapping has been shown to be disrupted in one patient showing neglect 
in consequence of frontoparietal damage (Duhamel et al., 1992). The patient performed well with 
targets flashed first into the right field and then into the left field. When she was asked to do the 
same task with a target flashed first in the left field and then in the right field, she completed the 
first saccade correctly, but never acquired the second target, even though this required her to make a 
saccade in the ipsilesional direction.  
Examining patients with unilateral lesions of various structures, Heide et al. (1995) found 
that both right and left lesions of the parietal posterior cortex (PPC) caused errors in double-step 
saccades. Each pair of targets was located either in the same hemifield (within–hemifield condition) 
or in different hemifields (between-hemifields condition). Both patients with right and left PPC 
lesions showed an elevated percentage of errors when in double–step saccades that involved 
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crossing the midline (between-hemifields condition). In addition, patients with right PCC – all of 
whom initially showed neglect – showed significant errors under conditions in which double-step 
saccades had to be performed entirely within the left visual field.   
Several lines of evidence support the proposal that the poster parietal cortex may have an 
important role in keeping track of spatial locations over saccades (see Leon and Shadlen, 2003). A 
basic model of spatial re-mapping deficits in neglect was recently proposed by Pisella and 
Mattingley (2004). The model accounts for the differential pattern of errors between right and left 
lesions (Heide et al., 1995), postulating a hemispheric asymmetry for re-mapping. According to this 
model, with damage to the left parietal posterior cortex, any saccade, directed toward the left or 
right visual field, results in a re-mapping deficit affecting the representation of the visual field 
located on the side opposite the direction of the saccade (i.e. the previous left visual field after a 
rightward saccade, the previous right visual field after a leftward saccade). With damage to the right 
posterior parietal cortex (patients with left neglect), leftward and rightward orienting produces 
different consequences: whereas after rightward saccade, only the previous left visual field is 
overwritten, leftward orienting results in a general loss of awareness for the locations of objects in 
both hemifields  
 
400 ms: abnormal temporal dynamics of visual attention 
Individuals without any neurological abnormality experience a significant loss of attention after 
engaging a target for the purpose of identification (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992; Shapiro, 
Arnell, & Raymond, 1997; Duncan, Humphreys, & Ward, 1997). This loss of temporal attention, 
known as ‘attentional blink’, is usually attributed to an inability to retain usable representation of a 
second target while completing attentive processing of a first target.  
 A standard procedure for quantifying this loss of temporal attention requires individuals to 
view a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) of letters presented successively at the same location. 
All the letters in the sequence are black except one, which is white. This is the first target the 
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subject is asked to identify. In half trials, this first target is followed, at some point in the sequence, 
by a black “X” (second target). Healthy observers require about 400 ms between targets to be able 
to report both targets accurately. Using this standard procedure, Husain et al. (1997) found that 
neglect patients have an abnormally severe and protracted attentional blink, lasting nearly three 
times as long as for healthy observers. 
Husain et al. (1997) examined the attentional blink at one central location. In a recent single-
case study Hillstrom et al. (2004) varied the location of the second target: whereas the first target 
was always presented at fixation, the second target appeared either at fixation or peripherally to the 
left or right. This variation led to an interesting finding: the patient with left-side neglect showed a 
prolonged attentional blink in identifying the second stimulus when the second stimulus appeared 
contralesionally, an attentional blink of normal duration when the stimulus appeared at fixation and 
no significant attentional blink when the second stimulus appeared ipsilesionally. These results 
suggest that the temporal dynamics of attentional processing may be enhanced compared to normal 
performance for ipsilesional stimuli, whereas it is significantly prolonged for stimuli appearing to 
the left. This suggestion of an atypically good performance on the right is consistent with previous 
investigations, which demonstrated ‘hyperattention’ toward stimuli on the right at the expense of 
stimuli to the left (De Renzi, Gentilini, Faglioni, & Barbieri, 1989; Di Pellegrino, Basso & 
Frassinetti, 1997; Gainotti, D’Erme, & Bartolomeo, 1991; Ladavas, Petronio, & Umiltà, 1990; 
Smania, Martini, Gambina, Tomelleri, Palamara, Natale, & Marzi, 1998).  
On the side of temporal perception, a spatio-temporal gradient in the allocation of attention 
may explain the distortion observed in evaluating temporal intervals. For example, Basso, Nichelli, 
Frassinetti, & Di Pellegrino (1996) examined time perception at different spatial locations in a 
patient showing severe left-sided neglect. The patient tended to overestimate the stimuli on the left 
side and, conversely, to underestimate those on the right side. This distortion was observed both in 
an interval comparison (300/700 ms) task and with a time production (1 s) paradigm.  
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Other studies focused on the issue of simultaneity and temporal order. Using a temporal 
order paradigm, Rorden, Mattingley, Karnath, & Driver (1997) found that patients may not be 
aware of objective simultaneity. In this study, patients were presented with two visual events, 
occurring on either side of fixation at various temporal asynchronies. The task was to judge which 
of two events (left or right) occurred first while maintaining fixation. Typically, healthy participants 
judge the temporal order of the events correctly at asynchronies greater than 40 ms. In contrast, 
when required to say which stimulus is presented first, neglect patients consistently reported the 
ipsilesional item as appearing first unless the contralesional item had a substantial lead (200 ms or 
more). This effect, known as “prior entry”, is found both in the visual modality and the auditory 
modality (Karnath, Zimmer, & Lewald, 2002).   
Recently Baylis, Simon, Baylis, & Rorden (2002) tested how extinction is affected by the 
introduction of a temporal asynchrony at the onset of two visual stimuli presented in the two 
hemifields. In a first experiment patients were asked to identify the stimuli. All patients showed 
maximal extinction when the stimuli were physically simultaneous. In a second experiment, the 
same patients were requested to report which stimulus was presented first. All patients required the 
contralesional item to a have a significant lead in order to be judged as occurring first.  
 
1 to 15 sec : impaired spatial working memory 
When neglect patients perform cancellation tasks it is frequently observed that they search over 
territory on the ipsilesional side that they have searched before. This amnesic aspect of exploration  
– called ‘re-visiting behaviour’ – was for example described by Wojciulik, Husain, Clarke, & 
Driver (2001) in a left neglect patient with right inferior frontal and basal ganglia damage. As in the 
cancellation tasks commonly used in clinical assessment, the patient was required to cancel visual 
targets (Os) in a display of scattered items (other letters). In one condition, the patient used a pen 
that left a visible mark; in a second condition, the same pen was used with its cap on, so that no 
visible marks were left and the patient needed to remember the location of items already cancelled. 
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Despite the instruction to cancel each target only once, the patient re-cancelled several targets in the 
invisible mark condition, suggesting that his working memory could not retain the locations of 
visited items. These re-cancellations were eliminated by substituting Os with drawings of common 
objects of different shapes, each object having a unique identity. Consistently with the hypothesis of 
a specifically spatial working memory impairment, these results suggest that non-spatial memory 
was intact and could prevent re-cancellations. 
Husain et al. (2001) confirmed this conclusion in a neglect patient with parietal damage, by 
measuring eye movements during visual search. The patient was also asked to click on a response 
button only when fixating a target that was judged to be a new discovery, not when re-fixating an 
old target that had previously been found and clicked. The study found that target locations on the 
right side were frequently re-fixated and, more importantly, were also treated as new discoveries at 
an abnormally high rate. Interestingly, the frequency of such revisiting was correlated with the 
performance in standard clinical tests measuring the severity of neglect.  
Mannan, Mort, Hodgson, Driver, Kennard, & Husain (2005) recently extended the study to 
16 neglect patients with lateralized damage. MRI mapping of lesions allowed the authors to 
distinguish between two types of pathological ‘re-clicking’ associated with different areas of 
damage. Neglect patients with right inferior frontal lesion demonstrated a constant or even 
decreasing probability of re-clicking over time, presumably depending on failure to inhibit 
responses to rightward locations. In contrast, for neglect patients with damage to the right 
intraparietal sulcus, the probability of re-clicking on a target increased with time (and saccades) 
from the initial discovery. Because they rarely re-clicked at short intervals, this pattern of behaviour 
suggests a deficit in keeping track of locations during extended search.  
Although these results may be consistent with an impairment in spatial working memory, 
several alternative interpretations warrant further consideration. First, because the time and number 
of intervening saccades are not independently manipulated, increased re-clicking cannot be 
attributed to a deficit in memory that is independent of saccadic eye movement. Furthermore, in 
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cancellation tasks, remembering the locations of items is incidental to the primary task of visual 
search. A natural question might thus be whether the same impairment would arise when no re-
mapping is required and patients are explicitly instructed to remember the location of objects in a 
visual array. 
This issue was addressed by Pisella, Berberovic and Mattingley (2004) using a change-
detection task in which participants were instructed to remember either the spatial locations, colours 
or shapes of a small number of items. They found that parietal patients were significantly worse in 
detecting changes in the location of visual objects relative to changes in their colour or shape. 
Crucially, this selective impairment in detecting changes in location only occurred when a 1 s delay 
was introduced between stimulus presentation and response.  
A direct measure of the spatial working memory capacity in neglect was recently provided 
by Malhotra, Jäger, Parton, Greenwood, Playford, Brown, Driver, & Husain (2005) using a variant 
of the traditional Corsi task. To disambiguate working memory processes from lateral biases 
leading to competition between target locations at encoding, all stimuli were arranged vertically in a 
columnar array. After a sequence of spatial locations had been displayed, a single location was 
probed visually, with subjects indicating verbally if it had been presented in the preceding sequence. 
Despite stimuli being presented vertically, neglect patients performed significantly worse than 
stroke patients without neglect. 
 In the study by Malhotra et al. (2005), stimuli were displayed on the vertical meridian of the 
screen. Ferber and Danckert (2006) found the same difficulty in maintaining spatial locations for 
stimuli displayed vertically and on the right side only. Again, neglect patients performed 
significantly worse than neurologically intact participants and right-brain damaged controls.  
 
How many “times” are impaired in neglect? 
The exploration of spatial deficits in neglect has provided evidence of neurobiological distinction 
between different frames of reference and regions of space: egocentric versus allocentric frame of 
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reference, far versus near space, personal versus extrapersonal space, perceptual versus motor 
impairment (Halligan et al., 2003). In this respect, the neuropsychological syndrome of unilateral 
spatial neglect has become a strong and increasingly relevant tool to dissect the functional and 
anatomical architecture of the systems involved in spatial cognition.  
  A natural question arising with respect to the temporal abnormalities observed in neglect 
patients is thus: Do these abnormalities reflect the impairment of a unique temporal mechanism? Do 
they arise in relation to different timing systems?  
Although observing an impairment at different timing scales may provide a relevant clue, 
future studies are needed to establish whether dissociated neural levels are involved. As for spatial 
cognition, we might thus discover that temporal cognition also involves a complex set of 
independent, although related, systems (for a review of the current timing literature, see, for 
example, Mauk and Buonomano, 2004).  
A further question, arising from the consideration of the preceding one, is how temporal 
deficits relate to the lateralized spatial bias in neglect. Are spatial and temporal deficits independent 
of each other, or are they linked? Very few studies have addressed this issue. As the following 
analysis shows, the answer appears to be highly dependent on the timescale considered.  
A spatial gradient in temporal dynamics is suggested for temporal processing at the 
timescale of 400 milliseconds. In a pioneering study, di Pellegrino, Basso and Frasinetti (1998) 
investigated the time for selection in a neurological patient with left-sided extinction. Using a 
variant of the attentional blink paradigm, they found a longer selection time for stimuli presented in 
contralesional space than in ipsilesional space. Similarly, Hillstrom et al. (2004), demonstrated an 
interacting temporal and spatial gradient of difficulty in shifting attention from one stimulus to 
another in a patient with neglect: when the second target appeared on the left, the patient required 
more time between targets to identify both accurately, compared to when the second target appeared 
at fixation or to the right.  
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These results suggest a spatial, horizontal gradient in the allocation of attention. Recently, 
Snyder and Chatterjee (2004) addressed the question of whether a spatial gradient may modulate 
temporal processing for stimuli presented on a vertical axis. This hypothesis was tested on a patient 
with an acute temporal-parietal stroke, showing extinction for contralesional visual stimuli. The 
experiment found that for vertically aligned stimuli the patient was poorer at judging the order of 
events in contralesional space than in ipsilesional space. More important, his performance improved 
with stimuli with larger vertical separations, as if limitations in awareness of successive events 
close in time could be compensated by greater distance in space.  
 Is a similar spatial gradient shown by temporal deficits at the level of seconds?  
Recent studies suggest a negative answer. Pisella, Berberovic, & Mattingley (2004) found that the 
impairment in detecting location changes over brief delays (1s) is equivalent across all horizontal 
positions in space. Consistent with the view that a spatial working memory impairment in neglect is 
not restricted to contralesional locations, Malhotra et al. (2005) demonstrated a deficit in 
maintaining spatial locations on purely vertical tasks. Ferber and Danckert (2006) found the same 
difficulty in maintaining spatial locations for stimuli displayed vertically, on the putatively non-
neglected side of space. 
Contrary to working memory deficits, re-mapping deficits exhibit a spatial gradient. With 
respect to temporal abnormalities at higher scales, the difference is in the coordinate system. At the 
timescale of re-mapping (10-100 ms) the spatial gradient is expressed with respect to the direction 
of the gaze shift, rather than to the horizontal position. The model by Pisella and Mattingley (2004) 
postulates an asymmetry between leftward and rightward orienting: whereas after rightward 
saccade, only the previous left visual field is overwritten, leftward orienting results in a general loss 
of awareness for the locations of objects in both hemifields. The re-mapping deficits are thus 
spatialized, however with respect to the direction of gaze.  
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Insert Table 1 about here 
 
 
Taken together these findings suggest that interaction between the spatial and temporal gradient of 
impairment depends on the scale of representation: whether temporal abnormalities reflect a spatial 
gradient depends on the timescale considered. A further aspect to be taken into account is the frame 
of reference in relation to which to measure the spatial gradient. Categorizing temporal 
abnormalities into different timescales allows us refine the notion of a spatio-temporal interaction, 
suggesting that different spatial frames may be involved at different timescales.  
 The above mentioned evidence concerns perceptive processes. A recent study by 
Bartolomeo, Bachoud-Lévi, Azouvi, & Chokron (2005) suggests that interactive spatio-temporal 
dynamics may also affect imagination. In the study, right-brain damaged patients were invited to 
conjure up a visual mental image of the map of France. They subsequently had to state whether 
auditorily presented towns or regions were situated to the left or right of Paris on the imagined map. 
Compared to non-neglect patients, neglect patients were slower for left than for right imagined 
location. This chronometric exploration of representational neglect suggests that under certain 
circumstances prolonged dynamics of attention may affect not only visual neglect, but also mental 
imagery abilities.  
  
What is the contribution of temporal abnormalit ies to neglect? 
Research on neglect has primarily been concerned with what patients with neglect can do despite 
their apparent lack of awareness. The lack of awareness per se, its nature, the paradoxes it raises, 
have attracted comparatively little interest (Halligan and Marshall, 1998).  
In the first part of this paper we presented temporal abnormalities from research carried out 
at the functional level of neuropsychological systems. In the following, we address the issue of the 
contribution of temporal abnormalities to the phenomenology of neglect, i.e. to the loss of 
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awareness for contralateral stimuli and events. How is it possible for an individual to lose half of the 
world, maintaining an apparently intact representation of the other half? Does a breakdown of 
spatial representation constitute a sufficient explanation?  
The idea that neglect patients may suffer from a ‘representational map reduced to one half’ 
was presented to the scientific community with the Piazza del Duomo experiment, being Piazza del 
Duomo a well-known square in Milan (Bisiach and Luzzati, 1978). The authors asked two patients 
with right-brain lesions to imagine themselves at one end of the square and describe all the business 
places around the square. As one would expect in the hypothesis of a defect of space representation, 
both patients failed to recall shops, cafes, etc., on the left.  
The next step in the experiment was for subjects to imagine themselves looking at the 
cathedral from the opposite end of the square. Remarkably, in this latter condition, patients named 
the previously neglected places but omitted those recalled just a few moments before.  
In discussing the theoretical implication of these results, Bisiach and Luzzati (1978) focused 
on the spatial domain, i.e. on the possibility that neglect may occur at the level of the internal 
representation of space, without concomitant visual input from the environment. This observation 
unambiguously suggested the representational nature of the disorder, or at least of some 
manifestations of it. The failure - proposed the authors - was to be explained as damage to the 
contralateral portion of the internal representation of space.  
The problem with this explanation is that it seems to account for the first part of the 
experiment, but not for its continuation. Having imagined the square from one given vantage point, 
patients were in fact required to imagine it from the opposite perspective.  
This shift of perspective shows that patients did indeed recall both halves of the square, the 
only trouble is that they did not recall them at the same time. The problem admits various 
formulations: 
 15 
1. Since the two halves that the patients report make a whole piazza, why cannot the whole 
piazza be reported? (Halligan and Marshall, 1998). Why didn’t they stick the two halves 
together?   
2. Describing first one half of the square, then the other half, patients provide in fact two 
inconsistent descriptions of the same object. Given that a few minutes elapsed between the 
first report and the second and that neglect preserves reasoning abilities, how is it possible 
for them not to be aware of the contradiction?  
3. Finally, if they remember all the places around the square, why don’t they acknowledge  that 
something in their description is missing?  
 
Beyond space: a dissociation in time  
The experimental paradigm of Bisiach and Luzzati (1978) was used by many subsequent studies. 
Employing this same paradigm, Rode, Rossetti, Perenin, & Boisson (2004) found, for example, that 
geographic information has to be spatialized to be neglected. In this study, a patient with persistent 
representational neglect was tested for his abilities to mentally evoke the map of France in two 
different conditions: in the first condition, he had to list all the towns he could “see” on the 
imagined map, in the second condition, he simply had to remember the names of as many French 
towns as possible. Left representational neglect was observed in the first condition only, when an 
iconic representation was required, whereas no deficit was observed when geographic information 
had to be accessed through a purely semantic mode. This result suggests a dissociation between a 
dual mode of coding and retrieval information from memory: visuo-spatial versus semantic.  
Ortigue, Viaud-Delmon, Annoni, Landis, Michel, Blanke, Vuilleumier, & Mayer (2001) 
report an analogous dissociation between co-ordinate systems in a right-brain damaged patient 
asked to mentally visualize the Place Neuve in Geneva. The patient systematically omitted items on 
his left side when the mental representation had to be generated with respect to his own body 
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position. Nonetheless, he succeeded perfectly when he only had to use allocentric spatial 
relationships between the different items.  
 Such reports of dissociated performance may be interpreted as dissociations between 
different modes of coding (visuo-spatial versus semantic) or different co-ordinate systems 
(egocentric versus allocentric). What renders the Piazza del Duomo experiment so puzzling is that 
here the dissociation intervenes between two halves, homogeneous in space as well as in the mode 
of coding. What is it then that prevents the patient from sticking them together?   
Berti and Rizzolatti (1992) propose that the encoding of space is a necessary prerequisite for 
conscious perception. If spatial encoding is prevented or impaired, as it is in neglect, the presence of 
the stimulus does not enter consciousness. With respect to the Piazza del Duomo experiment, a lack 
of spatial awareness per se does not however seem to constitute a sufficient explanation: a spatially 
constrained disorder of awareness (Berti, 2000) might explain why, at any one moment, the patient 
is unable to represent the whole scene, not why the two halves do not form a whole. 
If this occurs, it must be because the two halves of the square do not co-exist at the same 
time.  
 
Time and ontology: permanence, simultaneousness, succession 
Objects in the real world frequently move in and out of view, as when they pass behind occluding 
surfaces. Such occlusion disrupts the spatio-temporal continuity of items on the visual field. Yet 
occlusion does not disrupt the continuing existence of the objects in the scene (Michotte 1950).  
Imagine observing an object, for example a car, emerging from behind a building. The apparition of 
the object in the perceptive field marks the beginning of the presence of the object, but not the 
beginning of its existence: the object appears as pre-existent.  
Imagine observing the same object as it passes by and disappears behind another building. The 
object ceases to be visible, but continues to exist after its disappearance. The surface of the building 
prevents the object from being perceived, yet the object still exists, so that the observer expects to 
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see it reappear. Despite the interruption in spatio-temporal continuity, the object continues to exist, 
pre-existing the moment of its apparition (permanence of anteriority), and persisting in time after its 
disappearance (permanence of posteriority; Becchio & Bertone, 2003).  
Both these forms of permanence appear to be in some way disrupted in neglect. Differently 
from occlusion, neglect not only suspends the perceptive presence of objects, but it also interrupts 
their existence. As noted by J. J. Gibson, there are two quite different ways in which an object may 
disappear and appear. It may go out of sight or come into sight, on the one hand, and it may go out 
of existence or come into existence on the other (Gibson, Kaplan, Reynolds, & Wheeler, 1969).  
Neglect seems to entail this latter form of disappearance. The elements that from time to 
time fall in the left hemi-space do not simply go out of sight: disappearing from the patient’s 
representation, they also disappear from his conception. This implies that the patient affected by 
neglect does not simply ignore the presence of spatial elements on the left: the permanence these 
elements in the past as well as their persistence in the future must be impaired. This would explain 
why in the Piazza del Duomo experiment the patient fails to acknowledge any contradiction or 
manifest the awareness that something is missing. The left half of space neither pre-exists nor 
persists in the patient’s representation, which, in fact, behaves as if this half of space – and the 
elements that from time to time fall in it – has never existed and will never exist. A change of 
viewpoint, as requested in the experiment, thus has an ontological effect: one side of the space 
ceases to exist, the other side explodes into existence. The result is a sequence of hemi-structures 
independent both in time and ontology.   
“Things” wrote Kant in the Analytic of Principles (Critic of Pure Reason, 1787) “are 
coexistent, in so far as they exist in one and the same time. But how can we know that they exist in 
one and the same time? Only by observing that the order in the synthesis of apprehension of the 
manifold is arbitrary and a matter of indifference, that is to say, that it can proceed from A, through 
B, C, D, to E, or contrariwise from E to A.” This possibility is interrupted in neglect, preventing the 
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patient from proceeding from one half of the space to the other half. In this way, the two halves of 
the square emerge as structures completely independent in time.  
 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here 
 
 
As Kant inferred, “...let us assume that in a number of substances considered as phenomena each is 
completely isolated, that is, that no one acts upon another… the coexistence of these cannot be an 
object of possible perception and that the existence of one cannot, by any mode of empirical 
synthesis, lead us to the existence of another”.  
In normal conditions, temporal processing allows the integration of successive perception in 
a world of temporally enduring entities. Items successively selected co-exist within a continuous 
space-time. Disrupting the temporal continuity between one side of the space and the other, neglect 
not only prevents the representation of half the space, but renders impossible a temporal continuity 
between successively represented hemi-spaces.  
Of course, this breakdown in spatio-temporal continuity does not exclude that the 
information relative to the neglected hemi-space might be retrieved, for example, through a 
semantic mode of access (e.g. Rode et al., 2004). By claiming that in neglect half of space ceases to 
exist we do not intend to suggest that the information relative to the left side of space is definitely 
lost. As Berti (2000) noted, in neglect it is not the representation and the awareness of the stimuli 
per se that are impaired, but their representation in the left space. What the present analysis adds to 
this interpretation is the role of the temporal component. A spatial constrained disorder may explain 
the loss of half of space in present, but does not account for the ontological effects entailed by 
neglect. Elsewhere we described the consequences of neglect as an ontological slide (see Becchio & 
Bertone, 2005). Extending the disappearance to the past and future of objects, an impairment of the 
temporal dimension may represent one critical impairment resulting in this slide.  
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Conclusive considerations 
If we consider the phenomena of neglect, what is striking is not so much simply that the patient fails 
to represent half the space, but rather that he does not conceive it. 
We claimed that a spatial deficit may explain why the patient does not represent, at any 
given time, half of the space, but it does not in fact account for the patient’s inability to conceive it.  
This inability suggests that the representation of the left side of space is not only defective in 
the present, but that it is not maintained over time.  
Recent investigations support this interpretation, showing that combined with a lateralized 
spatial bias to the right, neglect may imply temporal abnormalities at various scales. Such 
abnormalities, we surmise, play a crucial role in explaining why half of the world gets lost in 
neglect, i.e. why the patient with neglect behaves as if that half of space does not exist (in the 
present), has never existed ( in the past) and will never exist (in the future) 
When we think of time, we think of how events follow on from one another, we rarely 
consider that time enters in the constitution of a world of enduring entities (Becchio and Bertone, 
2003). Neglect implies an impairment of temporal mechanisms, thus dramatically disclosing the 
link between time and ontology.  
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 Figure 1. Example of a double-step stimulus with the two targets A, and B, being flashed 
successively while the gaze is directed to a central fixation point (FP). When both saccades are 
performed after all targets have disappeared, the generation of a spatially accurate second saccade 
(from A to B) requires anticipating the outcome of the first saccade and programming the second 
saccade based on the anticipated end-point of the first (A). If subjects based their saccades on retinal 
position alone, their second saccades would end on B’ instead of B. Redrawn from Heide & Kömpf 
(1997). 
 
Figure 2. In normal conditions, the features of the square, independently from the order in which 
they have been mentioned, form a unitary spatio-temporal structure, in which they simultaneously 
exist. In neglect, the features that from time to time fall within the ipsilesional space are bound 
together in an independent structure. The simultaneousness is preserved within each aggregate, but 
not between the features of different aggregates. (t: time) 
  
 
Table 1. Relation between spatial and temporal abnormalities in neglect. 
 
 
Does the temporal deficit relate to a spatial bias? 
10 – 100 ms ? Asymmetry between leftward and rightward orienting  
400 ms ? Interacting temporal and spatial gradient of difficulty in shifting attention 
from one stimuli to another 
1-15 s  Spatial working memory deficit equivalent across all horizontal positions in 
space 
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